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11.1 Introduction
Since the early 1990s, the United States has experienced steadily widen-
ing current account deﬁcits, reaching 5.7 percent of gross national product
(GNP) in 2004 (see top panel of ﬁgure 11.1). These deﬁcits are large rela-
tive to the postwar U.S. historical experience. With the exception of a brief
period in the mid-1980s where current account deﬁcits reached 3.3 percent
of GNP, the U.S. current account has typically registered small surpluses
or deﬁcits averaging around 1 percent of GNP. As a consequence of the re-
cent deﬁcits, the U.S. net foreign asset position has declined sharply from
–5 percent of GNP in 1995 to about –26 percent by the end of 2004 (see
bottom panel of ﬁgure 11.5). The goal of this paper is to provide an ac-
count of this decline that relates it to other major macroeconomic events
and helps us to grasp its implications for welfare and policy.
Any attempt to do this must take into consideration a major change in
the pattern of asset trade between the United States and the rest of the
world (see ﬁgure 11.2). During the second half of the 1990s, the United
States accumulated foreign assets and liabilities at the rate of $765 billion
and $965 billion per year. About two-thirds of this consisted of increases
in the volume and value of equity holdings. This pattern reversed sharply
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Sources: Current account data are from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. NFA data are
from Gourinchas and Rey (chap. 1 in this volume).
A
Bin the ﬁrst half of the 2000s. The worldwide collapse in equity prices erased
a substantial fraction of the assets and liabilities that the United States had
accumulated during the 1990s, resulting in an increase of U.S. net holdings
of equity of about $232 billion per year. Despite this, the U.S. net foreign
asset position declined at the rate of $296 billion per year as U.S. net hold-
ings of debt (both public and private) declined at the rate of $528 billion per
year. While in the second half of the 1990s equity was driving most of the
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Fig. 11.2 Average annual changes in U.S. foreign assets and liabilities
Source: Gourinchas and Rey (chap. 1 in this volume).
Note:Change in value of equity estimated as sum over all quarters of diﬀerence between quar-
terly change in stocks and corresponding quarterly ﬂows.changes in U.S. foreign assets and liabilities, in the ﬁrst half of the 2000s,
these changes were mainly driven by debt.
This change in the composition of the U.S. current account is a natural
reﬂection of the two major macroeconomic events of this period. The ﬁrst
one is the dot-com bubble of the 1990s. Between 1990 and the peak in mid-
2000, U.S. equity prices increased nearly ﬁvefold, and the growth rate of eq-
uity prices accelerated from 10.4 percent per year between 1990 and 1995 to
21.2 percent per year between 1995 and 2000 (see panel A of ﬁgure 11.3).
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Fig. 11.3 Stock market boom of the 1990s: A, Share prices; B, Market capitaliza-
tion
Source: Datastream.The value of U.S. stock market capitalization grew even faster, doubling be-
tween 1990 and 1995, and then tripling between 1995 and the peak in 2000
(see panel B of ﬁgure 11.3). The stock market boom in the rest of the world
was less spectacular but still quite impressive by historical standards. Eq-
uity prices in the major foreign markets grew 7.9 percent per year during the
second half of the 1990s. As is well known, this episode ended with a sharp
downward adjustment that started in 2000. By 2003, equity prices in the
United States and abroad had fallen by 30 percent, and stock market capi-
talization had fallen by about 25 percent. Because these changes in equity
prices have taken place against a background of relatively low interest rates
and low inﬂation, being in the stock market surely was a good idea in the
second half of the 1990s but a lousy one in the ﬁrst half of the 2000s.
The second major macroeconomic event was the reemergence of large
ﬁscal deﬁcits in the United States after the Bush administration took over
in 2001 (see ﬁgure 11.4). Unlike the 1980s, the 1990s were a period of de-
clining budget deﬁcits and small surpluses. After 2000, budget deﬁcits
reappeared with a vengeance, however, reaching 4.8 percent of GNP in
2004. As a result, U.S. public debt has increased from 33 to 37 percent of
GNP between 2001 and 2004. An intriguing feature of this recent period is
that large budget deﬁcits have not been accompanied by any signiﬁcant in-
crease in the cost of borrowing for the federal government (see ﬁgure 11.4).
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Fig. 11.4 Budget deﬁcits and interest rates
Sources: Congressional Budget Oﬃce and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.Roughly speaking, the 1970s were characterized by low budget deﬁcits and
low interest rates, while the period 1980 to 1995 featured high budget
deﬁcits and high interest rates. But over the past ten years this pattern has
unraveled, with fairly high interest rates and low deﬁcits during the second
half of the 1990s, followed by low interest rates and large budget deﬁcits
since 2000.
What are the links between the stock market bubbles, budget deﬁcits,
and current accounts? As a ﬁrst cut at this question, we develop in sections
11.2 and 11.3 a conventional macroeconomic model that crudely, but eﬀec-
tively, encapsulates conventional views of the U.S. current account deﬁcit.
According to these views, its appearance in the second half of the 1990s re-
ﬂected an increase in U.S. productivity relative to the rest of the world that
led investors all over the world to place their savings in the U.S. stock mar-
ket. The situation reversed, and U.S. productivity declined in 2000, leading
to the stock market collapse. But the current account deﬁcit continued de-
spite this, now fueled by the drastic change in ﬁscal policy implemented by
the Bush administration. This change is usually attributed to purely ex-
ogenous factors such as the cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well
as a desire to cut taxes. This policy is, however, unsustainable and some-
thing must eventually give. Most observers think that this episode will end
with a painful ﬁscal adjustment although there are also those who argue
that the resolution will entail some default on the part of the U.S. govern-
ment.1
Although the conventional view is coherent and well grounded in theory,
it has diﬃculty accounting for two aspects of the data. The ﬁrst is observed
movements in the stock market. If the stock market only contains produc-
tive ﬁrms, its value should reﬂect that of the price and quantity of capital
they hold. But it is hard to ﬁnd evidence of increases in either of these vari-
ables that would justify the more than threefold increase in U.S. stock mar-
ket capitalization that occurred during the second half of the 1990s. And
it is even harder to ﬁnd evidence that would justify a one-quarter decline
in the ﬁrst few years of the 2000s.2 The second aspect of the data is the be-
havior of interest rates. The model predicts that the U.S. ﬁscal expansion
should increase the interest rate as government debt crowds out capital
from the portfolios of investors. But the evidence shows exactly the oppo-
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1. Few would argue that the U.S. government will fail to make stipulated payments, but still
some think that there is some probability that the U.S. government eﬀectively defaults on its
obligations by engineering a high and unexpected inﬂation that reduces the real value of these
payments.
2. Hall (2000, 2001) has argued that in fact such a large increase in the capital stock did oc-
cur during the 1990s. In particular, he argues that this increase took the form of intangible
capital such as brand loyalty as well as unique organizational structures based on eﬃcient use
of information technology. While this view might have seemed reasonable in the late 1990s be-
fore the stock market declined, it is far less appealing today as it is diﬃcult to explain why so
much of this intangible capital abruptly vanished in the second half of 2000.site. The real interest rate fell from above 3 percent in the second half of the
1990s to almost 0 percent in the early 2000s.3
What has been driving the stock market during the last decade? Why did
the interest rate fall in the midst of one of the largest ﬁscal expansions in
U.S. history? We argue in section 11.4 that the diﬃculties of the conven-
tional view are closely linked to its underlying assumption that all savings
are channeled into eﬃcient investments. If ﬁnancial markets do not work
as well, the economy might contain investments that deliver a rate of return
that is below the growth rate of the economy. These investments are ineﬃ-
cient as they absorb on average more resources than they produce.4 It is
well known that in this situation both stock market bubbles and govern-
ment debt can play the useful role of displacing ineﬃcient investments,
raising the interest rate and hence the consumption and welfare of all.
Moreover, those who create the bubbles or issue the debt receive rents that
can be interpreted as a fee for providing this service.5 A crucial and novel
aspect of the model presented here is that it provides a formal description
of how bubbles and debt interact with each other as they compete for a
ﬁxed pool of savings.
In sections 11.5 and 11.6 we show that these interactions provide a new
perspective on recent macroeconomic events. In section 11.5 we construct
an equilibrium in which the stock market initially creates a bubble that
eliminates ineﬃcient investments. The world economy operates eﬃciently,
and the interest rate and welfare are both high. But sustaining a bubble re-
quires that current investors believe that future investors will buy it from
them. At some point, there will be a self-validating change in investor ex-
pectations about what other investors will do and this triggers the collapse
of the bubble. As a result, ineﬃcient investments reappear and the inter-
est rate declines. The government reacts to this by running large budget
deﬁcits and expanding public debt suﬃciently to crowd out these ineﬃcient
investments. According to this “benevolent” view, budget deﬁcits consti-
tute a welfare-improving policy response to the collapse of the bubble.
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3. A popular explanation for the decline in interest rates is that a global glut of saving has
appeared coincidentally at the same time as the ﬁscal deﬁcits (see, for example, Bernanke
2005). According to this view, government debt need not displace capital from the portfolio
of investors. As we shall see later, our story is consistent with this observation. In fact, we pro-
vide a novel explanation of the glut of saving based on the collapse of the bubble.
4. The resources devoted to keep these investments are roughly equal to the growth rate
times the capital stock. The resources obtained from such investments are roughly equal to
the rate of return times the capital stock. If the growth rate exceeds the rate of return, the econ-
omy obtains additional resources by eliminating these ineﬃcient investments. See Abel et al.
(1989).
5. The paper that discovered dynamic ineﬃciency is Samuelson (1958). See also Shell (1971)
for a revealing discussion of this problem. For the analysis of government debt, see Diamond
(1965), Woodford (1990), and Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2003). For the analysis of stock mar-
ket bubbles, see Tirole (1985), Grossman and Yanagawa (1993), King and Ferguson (1993),
Olivier (2000), and Ventura (2002, 2003).Moreover, they also provide a windfall for the U.S. government as it allows
it to appropriate the value of the bubble.
Section 11.6 constructs an alternative equilibrium that again begins with
the stock market creating a bubble that eliminates ineﬃcient investments.
The government initially refrains from running budget deﬁcits, and this cre-
ates space for the bubble to grow. At some point, investors revise upwards
their expectations of the likelihood that there is a change in government,
and the new government would use ﬁscal policy to appropriate the windfall
associated with replacing the bubble with government debt. This change in
investor expectations leads to the collapse of the bubble. There is then a
change in government, and the new government starts a ﬁscal expansion
that validates the expectations of investors. The interest rate need not in-
crease because the collapse of the bubble forces savers to seek alternative in-
vestments, and this raises the demand for government debt. This ﬁscal pol-
icy implements a transfer from the owners of the bubble at home and abroad
to the U.S. government. In this “cynical” view, budget deﬁcits constitute a
beggar-thy-neighbor policy that is responsible for the collapse of the bubble.
Interestingly, the benevolent and cynical views are observationally equiv-
alent. In both of them, the collapse of the bubble is accompanied by a decline
in the interest rate and a large ﬁscal expansion that leads to a high but stable
level of debt. In both views, this high level of debt is compatible with the U.S.
running budget deﬁcits forever (although smaller than the current ones). In
both of them, the U.S. net foreign asset position can remain negative forever.
In both views, the collapse of the bubble generates a loss for shareholders at
home and abroad and a windfall for the U.S. government. The only diﬀer-
ence between the two views lies in the shock that caused this chain of events.
While in the benevolent view this shock is a change in investor expectations
about other investors, in the cynical view this shock is a change in investor
expectations about the government. In both interpretations, subsequent
events corroborated the corresponding change in investors’ expectations.
Of course, this is not the ﬁrst paper to be written on the U.S. current ac-
count deﬁcit. A substantial literature in the past few years has studied the
determinants and sustainability of the U.S. current account deﬁcit. Much
of this literature has adopted what we have termed as conventional views
without much discussion and has instead focused on determining its im-
plications. Most notably, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000, 2004, and 2005),
Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005), and Roubini and Setser (2004) have all
argued a large current account reversal is inevitable and will likely be ac-
companied by a large and disruptive depreciation in the dollar.6
464 Aart Kraay and Jaume Ventura
6. We do not analyze the implications of our scenarios for the real exchange rate although
it would be straightforward to do it. The results would also be straightforward and standard.
The real exchange rate would move in opposite direction to the current account and the mag-
nitude of the change would depend on the usual parameters, that is, the elasticity of substitu-
tion between traded and nontraded goods and the elasticity of substitution between traded
goods produced at home and abroad.The two papers that are perhaps closer to this one are Ventura (2001)
and Caballero, Farhi, and Hammour (2005). Both of these papers chal-
lenge conventional views and stress instead the eﬀects of an expectations-
driven stock market bubble on the U.S. net foreign asset position. Ventura
emphasized the role of the dot-com bubble as the main driver of the cur-
rent account deﬁcits during the second half of the 1990s and argued that
those deﬁcits would be sustainable in the absence of a bubble collapse. Un-
like this paper, Ventura did not oﬀer a formal model connecting stock
market bubbles and the net foreign asset position, nor did he analyze the
potential interactions between bubbles and ﬁscal deﬁcits. Caballero, Farhi,
and Hammour study a one-country model in which high expectations
about the future create suﬃcient savings to fund the investment necessary
to validate these expectations. In contrast, we work with a world equilib-
rium model in which there is a ﬁxed pool of world savings, and the stock
market bubble, capital, and public debt compete for it. While Caballero,
Farhi, and Hammour place the savings decision and adjustment costs in
investment at center stage of their story, we instead emphasize the portfo-
lio decision and ﬁnancial market imperfections.
11.2 A Model of Crowding-Out with Debt and Capital
This section presents a stylized model of productivity, debt, and deﬁcits.
It depicts a world where young individuals save to provide for their old age
consumption. These savings are used to ﬁnance both productive invest-
ments and government deﬁcits. Fiscal policy is used to redistribute con-
sumption across diﬀerent generations. In particular, deﬁcits ﬁnance addi-
tional present consumption by crowding out productive investments and
lowering future consumption. This model constitutes a useful starting
point for our argument as it neatly encapsulates conventional views on
the eﬀects and the sustainability of ﬁscal deﬁcits.
Consider a world with two regions: the United States (U.S.) and the rest
of the world (ROW). This world is populated by overlapping generations
of young and old. Each generation contains a continuum of members with
aggregate size one that are evenly distributed across the two regions. Let I
and I∗be the sets of U.S. and ROW residents, respectively. As usual, use an
asterisk to denote ROW variables and omit the asterisk to denote U.S. vari-
ables. There is a single good that can be used for consumption and invest-
ment. Each generation receives an endowment of this good during youth,
which is evenly distributed among all its members. The endowment grows
from one generation to the next at a (gross) rate  . We normalize units so
that the endowment of generation t is equal to  t, and we express all quan-
tity variables as a share of this endowment.
The young are patient and risk-neutral, and they maximize expected old
age consumption. Given this objective, the young save all their income, and
the old consume all of theirs. Because the income of the young consists
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all the quantity variables are to be interpreted as a share of world savings.
The income of the old consists of the return to their savings plus a transfer
from the government which could be positive or negative. We shall assume
throughout that this transfer is independent of an individual’s actions.
Therefore, the only important decision in any individual’s life is how to in-
vest his or her savings so as to maximize its expected return. This portfolio
choice is at the heart of the story we want to tell here.
The menu of investment options available to the young consists of gov-
ernment debt and ﬁrms. Government debt consists of one-period bonds.
We assume that ﬁscal policies are consistent in the sense that, if the market
decided not to roll over the debt, the government would be able (and will-
ing) to generate enough of a surplus so as to redeem all the bonds issued.
This ensures that debt payments are made with probability one. It also im-
plies that debt issued by U.S. and ROW governments must oﬀer the same
interest rate. Let r t 1 be this common (gross) interest rate for holding gov-
ernment debt from date t to date t   1.
Firms are investment projects run by entrepreneurs. A fraction  t of
these projects is located in the United States (although some of these proj-
ects might be managed by ROW entrepreneurs). We assume that this share
can vary stochastically over time within the unit interval. Firms purchase
capital during the entrepreneur’s youth, produce during the entrepreneur’s
old age, and then distribute a single dividend per unit of capital before
breaking up. This dividend or production is random and has a mean  . To
ﬁnance the purchase of capital, ﬁrms can use private or internal funds (i.e.,
the entrepreneur’s own savings) or they can go public and raise external
funds in the stock market (i.e., the savings of young other than the entre-
preneur). Firms that are ﬁnanced by internal funds oﬀer an expected gross
return equal to  . Firms that are ﬁnanced by external funds are subject to
agency costs equal to   and oﬀer an expected gross return   –  .7 There-
fore, investing in self-ﬁnanced ﬁrms is preferred to holding stocks of traded
ﬁrms.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the economy is suﬃciently pro-
ductive, that is,     . This ensures that the expected return to capital ex-
ceeds the growth rate of savings. For the next couple of sections, we further
assume that agency costs are not too severe, that is,    –  . This is equiv-
alent to saying that ﬁnancial frictions are small, and the stock market is
close enough to the frictionless paradigm. This assumption turns out to be
crucial and will be removed in section 11.4.
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7. Agency costs arise from incentive problems that are created by the separation between
ownership and control. One example is the cost of monitoring the manager to ensure that he
or she does not embezzle funds from the ﬁrm. Another example is the eﬃciency loss due to
less than optimal eﬀort in situations where shareholders imperfectly observe the manager’s
actions or information set.Each generation contains two types of young: entrepreneurs and share-
holders. The former have good investment projects that they can convert
into a ﬁrm, while the latter do not. We assume the measure of the set of en-
trepreneurs is ε. For simplicity, assume both regions have the same distri-
bution of types. It follows from our assumptions that entrepreneurs either
invest in their own self-ﬁnanced ﬁrms or buy government debt, while share-
holders are forced to choose between holding stocks of publicly traded
ﬁrms and government debt.8 Therefore, we can write the expected con-
sumption of the diﬀerent individuals as follows:
(1) EtCi,t 1   
where T i,t 1 is the transfer that old individual i receives from its govern-
ment9 (remember that all quantity variables are expressed as a share of the
world endowment). Unless r t 1    , entrepreneurs enjoy higher expected
consumption and therefore higher welfare than shareholders because of
their ability to manage ﬁrms.10
Let Dt be total (U.S. plus ROW) government debt, and let  t be the frac-
tion of this total that has been issued by the United States. Then we can
write debt dynamics as follows:
(2) Dt 1    Dt  ∑
i∈I∪I∗
T i,t 1
(3)  t 1   Dt 1    t   (Dt 1  ∑
i∈I∪I∗
T i,t 1)  ∑
i∈I
T i,t 1
Equation (2) shows that debt equals to debt payments plus the primary
deﬁcit. The latter is nothing but the sum of all the transfers received by the
old. Equation (3) shows how the U.S. share evolves, for given primary
deﬁcits of the two regions. We assume that governments never default on
their debts. This assumption will be removed later, but it turns out not to
be crucial.
r t 1  
 
if i is an entrepreneur,
if i is a shareholder,
max( , r t 1)   EtT i,t 1
max(    , r t 1)   EtT i,t 1
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8. Who runs publicly traded ﬁrms? Remember each generation contains a continuum of in-
dividuals with aggregate income equal to  t. Assume each (inﬁnitesimal) entrepreneur can
run a (noninﬁnitesimal) ﬁrm of size  . If this entrepreneur uses only internal funds, his or her
expected utility is     t   di. If this entrepreneur uses external funds, his or her expected util-
ity is old age consumption is (  –  )    t   di   m; where m is the manager’s fee. Because there
is free entry, the equilibrium manager’s fee is m      t   di. Because this fee is inﬁnitesimal,
it constitutes a negligible cost for a noninﬁnitesimal ﬁrm of size  , and we can disregard it.
Therefore, the model depicts a world where a small subset of entrepreneurs use external funds
to build large ﬁrms that are traded in the stock market, while a large subset of entrepreneurs
runs small ﬁrms using internal funds.
9. We are assuming here that only the old receive transfers.
10. This comparison holds both the transfer and the date of birth constant. Remember that
expected consumption is measured as a share of the endowment, and therefore welfare is
given by  t   EtCi,t 1. A shareholder of a future generation might enjoy more welfare than an
entrepreneur of the present generation.The interest rate depends on the amount of debt that the government is
trying to place in the market. In particular, we have the following:
(4) r t 1   
Equation (4) shows how the interest rate increases with debt. For low val-
ues of debt, the interest rate is   –   as the marginal buyer is a shareholder.
For high values of debt, the interest rate increases to   as the marginal
buyer of debt is now an entrepreneur. An important observation is that the
assumption that ﬁnancial frictions are small implies that the interest rate
always exceeds the growth rate.
Let Kt denote the world capital stock, which is
(5) Kt   1   Dt.
Equation (5) simply says that capital and debt must add to world savings
as they are the only investment options available. Let NFAt be the U.S. net
foreign asset position, that is, the diﬀerence between U.S. wealth and the
U.S. capital stock. This is a measure of U.S. capital exports to the rest of
the world, and is given by
(6) NFAt   (0.5    t)   Dt   (0.5    t)   Kt.
Equation (6) shows that the net foreign asset position of the United States
contains two pieces. The ﬁrst term is the diﬀerence between the debt held
by U.S. residents and the debt issued by the U.S. government, that is, the
ﬁrst term is U.S. net borrowing. The second term is the diﬀerence between
the capital stock owned by U.S. residents and the capital stock located
within the United States, that is, the second term is U.S. net holdings of eq-
uity.11
The mechanics of this model are as follows: equations (2) to (4) jointly
determine the dynamics of debt and the interest rate for a given sequence
of primary deﬁcits. With these dynamics at hand, equations (5) and (6) de-
termine the world capital stock and the pattern of trade. With the help of
an additional assumption on how these deﬁcits are distributed among old
individuals, equation (1) describes the welfare of diﬀerent individuals. It is
straightforward to see that this world economy has a unique equilibrium.
    if Dt   1   ε,
[    ,  ] if Dt   1   ε,
  if Dt   1   ε.
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11. Note that U.S. residents own half of the world debt and half of the world capital stock.
This only because we have assumed both regions have the same population size, the same dis-
tribution of types, and the same endowment. This is just a harmless simpliﬁcation as it is
straightforward to generalize the model to include asymmetries in these variables. Note also
that since we have assumed that government debt consists of one-period bonds and ﬁrms last
only one period, the current account is equal to the net foreign asset position and we can use
equation (6) to talk about either concept. This is another simpliﬁcation, of course, as the real
world contains long-lived assets. But it will not play a role in what follows.We use it next to interpret the evolution of the world economy during the
last decade.
11.3 Conventional Views
Although stylized, this model captures well conventional views of the
sources and eﬀects of the large and persistent deterioration in the U.S. net
foreign asset position during the last decade. According to these views, in
the second half of the 1990s, the United States became a more attractive
place to invest relative to the rest of the world. That is, the number of good
investment projects in the United States grew relative to ROW (i.e., there
was an increase in  t). Many have identiﬁed the boom in the information
technology (IT) sector as a main reason for this. Although this sector grew
rapidly worldwide in the second half of the 1990s, the United States bene-
ﬁted more from this growth due to its strong technological lead relative to
Europe and Japan. Others have pointed to the ﬂurry of currency and bank-
ing crises in emerging markets as the main reason for the United States be-
coming a more attractive place to invest relative to ROW. These crises,
which started in Mexico and moved to East Asia and Russia, led to a down-
ward reassessment of the expected return to emerging market projects.
For either or both of these reasons, the story goes, investors all over the
world decided to put their savings into the U.S. stock market, and this is
what generated the current account deﬁcits of the second half of the 1990s.
This is consistent with the evidence reported in ﬁgure 11.2 that, in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s, a large component of the change in the U.S. net for-
eign asset position consisted of a decline in net holdings of equity. The
story becomes a bit fuzzy when it comes to explaining the reversal in net
holdings of equity that took place in the ﬁrst half of the 2000s, also re-
ported in ﬁgure 11.2. In the context of our model, this reversal could be
seen as a decline in the number of good investment projects in the United
States relative to ROW (i.e., there was a decrease in  t), although there is
scant direct evidence supporting this view.
Although this account might sound reasonable at a superﬁcial level, it
should be met with a healthy dose of skepticism after looking at the actual
numbers. Remember that the value of the stock market increased threefold
from 1995 to 2000 and then declined by one-quarter from 2000 to 2003. If
the stock market contains only productive ﬁrms, its value must reﬂect that
of the stock of capital held by these ﬁrms. That is, the increase in stock mar-
ket capitalization requires a comparable increase in the price of capital, in
the quantity of capital or in both. To the extent that capital is reproducible,
its price cannot exceed the cost of producing additional units. In the
model, this cost is constant and equal to one. Naturally, we could extend
the model to allow for congestion eﬀects on the cost of capital as in the
popular Q-theory of investment. But it seems unlikely that such an exten-
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ket.12
It also seems unlikely that this rise and fall can be explained by changes
in the quantity of capital. In the model world savings grow at a constant
rate  , and so a large increase in the U.S. stock of capital would have to be
associated with a decline in ROW’s stock of capital. However, the increase
in stock market capitalization took place all around the industrial world.
Naturally, one could extend the model to allow for exogenous increases in
savings and therefore the capital stock. But this would not get us very far
quantitatively. Because the U.S. capital stock is about twice U.S. GNP, a
threefold increase in the capital stock during the second half of the 1990s
would have required astronomical investment rates!
Some have argued that the boom in the stock market in part reﬂected the
accumulation of intangible capital, such as brand loyalty or unique orga-
nizational structures.13The accumulation of this kind of capital did not re-
quire investment as conventionally measured and therefore constituted a
windfall to its owners. There was, in fact, some evidence in the 1990s point-
ing in this direction: for example, the emergence of business models built
on the eﬃcient use of information technology as a valuable form of intan-
gible capital (most notably, various forms of e-commerce). However, while
the accumulation of this intangible capital could in principle account for
the run-up in the value of stockmarket during the 1990s, it seems much
harder to argue that it was the decumulation of this form of capital that was
behind the stock market decline in the second half of 2000. Why would the
value of organizational forms based on the use of information technology
such as e-commerce suddenly have vanished in the second half of 2000?
The question thus remains: how did the value of the stock market grow so
much in the second half of the 1990s and then drop in the ﬁrst half of the
2000s?
Of course, there have also been many voices arguing that the U.S. stock
market during this period was fueled by a bubble rather than by an increase
in U.S. productivity relative to the rest of the world. According to this al-
ternative view, foreign investors were not buying U.S. ﬁrms in the IT sector
because of their high productivity. Instead, they were buying them because
they were expecting to resell later at a higher price. The appearance of a
bubble might bring huge capital gains to those that are able to create it, and
this could explain the massive increases in equity prices during the second
half of the 1990s. But to realize these capital gains, one must ﬁrst ﬁnd buy-
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12. Hall (2001) estimates the price of installed capital in the United States since 1946, and
ﬁnds that this price increased by only about 25 percent during the second half of the 1990s.
See also Hall (2004) for an attempt to measure the cost of capital.
13. See Hall (2000, 2001). It could also be that this intangible capital already existed, and it
was the demand for it that increased during this time. To the extent that intangible capital was
irreproducible, its price could also have increased.ers for the bubble, and this is only possible if the bubble promises a suﬃ-
ciently attractive return. That is, a bubble can be created if and only if it is
expected to grow fast enough so as to justify buying it.
It is possible to examine this alternative interpretation within our model.
To do this, we formally deﬁne a stock market bubble as a situation in which
ﬁrms without capital are valued and traded in the stock market. We refer
to these ﬁrms as “bubbly” ﬁrms, as opposed to the “productive” ﬁrms that
own the capital stock. The question is whether bubbly ﬁrms can survive in
a stock market that also contains productive ﬁrms. Let Bt be the asset
bubble (or aggregate value of bubbly ﬁrms as a share of world savings). Be-
cause bubbly ﬁrms do not distribute dividends, the return to holding them
consists only of their price appreciation. Therefore, the young will buy
these ﬁrms if and only if the expected rate of price appreciation is high
enough:
(7)     r t 1 if Bt   0
Otherwise, the young would prefer to hold shares in productive ﬁrms or
government bonds. A bubble can therefore create its own demand only by
growing on average as fast or faster than the interest rate. But the growth
of the bubble cannot be so fast so as to outgrow world savings, that is, Bt
  1 must hold in all dates and states of nature. And this requirement is in-
compatible with equation (7) if the interest rate exceeds the growth rate.
Therefore, we conclude that bubbly ﬁrms cannot survive in the stock mar-
ket in this case. Our assumption that ﬁnancial frictions are small implies
that the interest rate always exceeds the growth rate and therefore rules out
the possibility of stock market bubbles. This, we think, is the ﬁrst serious
shortcoming of the standard or conventional view.
This view also holds that the current account deﬁcits continued after
2000 due to the sharp change in ﬁscal policy implemented by the Bush ad-
ministration (i.e., an increase in the U.S. primary deﬁcit that leads to an in-
crease in  t). This ﬁscal policy consists of spending more, cutting taxes, and
ﬁnancing the resulting budget deﬁcits by issuing government debt. Over-
whelmingly, this change in policy has been interpreted as a political deci-
sion and not as an economic policy response to a speciﬁc macroeconomic
disturbance. In other words, the U.S. ﬁscal expansion has been treated as
an exogenous shock to the macroeconomic landscape. Much of the incre-
ment to public debt has been placed abroad. Between end-2000 and end-
2003, U.S. public debt increased by $500 billion, while foreign holdings of
U.S. Treasury bills increased by almost the same amount. And to the extent
that public debt has been placed at home, it likely has crowded out U.S. cor-
porate debt and forced ﬁrms to place an increasing fraction of their own
debt abroad. Through these direct and indirect channels, the budget
deﬁcits of the Bush administration account for a substantial part of the
EtBt 1  
Bt
The Dot-Com Bubble, the Bush Defects, and the U.S. Current Account 471large increase in net borrowing from abroad shown in ﬁgure 11.2. The im-
portant question is whether this situation is sustainable and, if it is not, how
the necessary adjustment will look.
To answer this question, we use the model to analyze the eﬀects of a ﬁs-
cal expansion in the United States. The experiment is as follows. Initially
both regions have no debt and follow balanced-budget policies, that is,
Dt   0 and Σi∈I∪I∗ T i,t   0. At some date, the United States switches its pol-
icy for exogenous reasons and decides to increase spending, cut taxes, and
ﬁnance the resulting deﬁcit by going into debt, while ROW keeps its bud-
get balanced, that is, Σi∈I T i,t   T    0 and Σi∈I∗ T i,t   0. The questions we
address next are What are the possible endings for this ﬁscal episode? and
What are its welfare consequences?
When the ﬁscal deﬁcits appear, government debt starts growing at an ac-
celerating rate, crowding out the investments of the shareholders. The
growth of the debt is fueled directly by the deﬁcits but also indirectly by un-
favorable debt dynamics resulting from the interest rate exceeding the
growth rate. In fact, it is this second component growing over time that
leads to accelerating debt growth. If the ﬁscal expansion lasts long enough,
the debt also starts crowding out the investments of the entrepreneurs. At
this point the interest rate goes up, debt dynamics become more unfavor-
able and debt accumulation further accelerates. As debt accumulates, U.S.
net borrowing abroad increases. Because the debt crowds out capital from
the portfolios of investors worldwide, U.S. net holdings of equity decline in
absolute value.
This situation is not sustainable as the accelerating growth rate of debt is
incompatible with a ﬁxed pool of savings, and the U.S. eventually must go
through a period of ﬁscal adjustment. This essentially means that the U.S.
must reverse its ﬁscal policy (as it does not want to default) and start run-
ning suﬃciently large surpluses, that is, Σi∈I T i,t   T   (  – r t/ )   Dt. Not
surprisingly, the magnitude of the ﬁscal adjustment increases with the level
of debt. When the debt is higher, the surpluses need to be larger, last longer,
or both.
Assuming that the U.S. government only makes transfers to U.S. citi-
zens, the ﬁscal expansion increases the welfare of current U.S. generations
in detriment of future ones. After all, in this model a policy of budget
deﬁcits is nothing but a policy of passing the bill forward. When this pol-
icy is implemented, the old consume beyond the return to their savings and
pass the bill to the next generation. This bill includes their extra consump-
tion plus the interest. Rather than paying the bill, the next generation fur-
ther increases it by also consuming more than the return to their savings
and then passes the bill along to the following generation. This keeps go-
ing on for as long as the government follows a policy of running deﬁcits and
rolling over the debt. But the bill is growing too fast and must eventually be
paid. This is what a ﬁscal adjustment is all about. The longer it takes for
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for the United States to face it.
The welfare of present generations is also aﬀected by the ﬁscal expansion
indirectly through its eﬀects on the interest rate. High interest rates raise
the expected consumption of young shareholders both in the United States
and ROW. Because interest rate costs are added to the bill, future genera-
tions of U.S. residents are also supporting higher consumption of current
ROW generations. This constitutes a positive spillover of the U.S. ﬁscal ex-
pansion on ROW. The ﬁscal adjustment will eliminate it, and this is why
ROW residents might prefer this to happen as late as possible.
Of course, one could argue that this scenario is unrealistic as it assumes
that the U.S. government will honor its debt in all contingencies. But re-
laxing this assumption has only minor eﬀects on the overall story. To see
this, replace equations (2) and (4) for these straightforward generaliza-
tions:14
(8) Dt 1   
(9) r t 1   
where  t is the (exogenous) probability that the U.S. government defaults
on its debt. A reasonable assumption is that this probability grows as the
debt increases, but we need not make it here. Equation (8) recognizes that
now debt can be defaulted upon, while equation (9) recognizes that the ex-
pected return on government debt includes the promised return minus the
expected loss from default. Note that default risk makes debt dynamics
even more unfavorable by raising the interest rate. In other words, default
risk makes the current situation even more unsustainable.
With a positive default probability, the U.S. ﬁscal expansion might have
a diﬀerent ending. If the current deﬁcit goes on long enough and the re-
quired ﬁscal adjustment becomes too large, the U.S. government might
simply default on its debt. In this case, the adjustment takes place in a dra-
matic fashion. The generation of old (U.S. and ROW) shareholders that
suﬀers the default pays the entire bill for the excess consumption of its U.S.
predecessors. Because half of the shareholders are not U.S. residents, half
      t if Dt   1   ε,
[      t,     t] if Dt   1   ε,




 1     Dt  ∑
i∈I∪I∗
T i,t 1 with probability 1    t,
0 with probability  t.
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14. One can think of default as surprise inﬂation that erases the real value of the debt. Here
we are also assuming that the ROW government keeps with its policy of having no debt. Oth-
erwise, we should also break down equations (8) to (9) into their two regional components.of the bill is therefore paid by ROW citizens. In this scenario, current U.S.
economic policy is simply increasing consumption and welfare of current
U.S. residents at the expense of future U.S. and ROW residents. This con-
stitutes a negative spillover of the U.S. ﬁscal expansion on ROW. A ﬁscal
adjustment would ensure that this scenario does not happen and, as a re-
sult, ROW residents might prefer the United States to reduce its budget
deﬁcits even if this lowers the interest rate.
Another problem with this standard story is the behavior of the interest
rate. While the model predicts that the U.S. ﬁscal expansion will increase
the interest rate, the evidence shows exactly the opposite. Figure 11.4
showed that, in the midst of one of the largest ﬁscal expansions in U.S. his-
tory, the interest rate fell from above 3 percent to close to 0 percent. The
model can account for this observation if there is a decline in the expected
return to capital (i.e., a decline in  or ε) or an increase in agency costs (i.e.,
an increase in  ).15 Given the magnitude of both the fall in interest rates
and the increase in budget deﬁcits, the decline in productivity or an in-
crease in agency costs would have to be very large. There is scant evidence
for a major decline in world productivity. And despite the intense media
coverage of some ﬁnancial scandals such as Enron or Parmalat, it also
seems unlikely that frictions in ﬁnancial markets increased dramatically
overnight.
Another popular hypothesis for why interest rates have fallen is that a
global “glut of saving” appeared (see Bernanke 2005). According to this
hypothesis, the increase in saving exceeded the increase in public debt,
leading to a decline in interest rates. There are various explanations for
where these savings are coming from, including an increased appetite for
reserves by Asian central bankers and a windfall of rising oil prices in the
high-saving oil producing countries. While these stories about exogenous
shocks are reasonable, we shall argue in the following that another expla-
nation for the glut of saving is the collapse of the bubble itself. Once the
bubble was no longer available, savers endogenously shifted to other assets,
most notably, U.S. government debt.
To sum up, the model crudely but eﬀectively encapsulates conventional
views of the U.S. current account deﬁcit. Its appearance in the second half
of the 1990s reﬂects an increase in U.S. productivity relative to the rest of
the world that led investors all over the world to place their savings in the
U.S. stock market. This situation ended with the stock market collapse in
2000. But the current account deﬁcits continued after this now fueled by
the drastic change in ﬁscal policy implemented by the Bush administra-
tion. This policy is, however, unsustainable, and something must eventu-
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15. We have assumed that  ,  , and ε are constant. Note, however, that all the equations of
the model still apply if we assume that these parameters vary stochastically over time.ally give. Most observers think that this episode will end with a painful ﬁs-
cal adjustment although there are also those who argue that the resolution
will entail some default on the part of the U.S. government. The stylized
model developed in the preceding shows how all of these observations ﬁt
together.
But the model is not free of problems, though. It cannot explain ob-
served movements in equity prices, and it can only explain why the interest
rate fell in the midst of one of the largest ﬁscal expansions in U.S. history
by appealing to exogenous changes in saving or productivity. How can we
come to grips with these observations? The preceding analysis relies to a
large extent on the condition that the interest rate exceeds the growth rate.
This condition rules out the existence of stock market bubbles and under-
lies the notion that a policy of continued ﬁscal deﬁcits is unsustainable. But
this condition is not satisﬁed in the data. Figure 11.5 plots the ex-post real
one-year Treasury bill rate and the real GDP growth rate for the United
States since 1970. With the exception of the 1980s, the interest rate has been
consistently below the growth rate for almost all years during this period.
More important for our purposes, since 1992 interest rates have averaged
1.7 percent while GDP growth has averaged 3.3 percent. As we shall show
next, the behavior of the world economy is quite diﬀerent when the growth
rate exceeds the interest rate.
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Fig. 11.5 Interest rates and growth rates
Sources: GDP growth is from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, and interest rates are from
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.11.4 A Model of Crowding-Out with Debt, Bubbles, and Capital
Assume next that agency costs are severe, that is,    –  . This is
equivalent to saying that ﬁnancial frictions are large, and the stock market
is far from the frictionless paradigm. In this case, the world economy can
experience stock market bubbles, that is, the stock market might contain
unproductive or bubbly ﬁrms that never deliver a dividend. The only rea-
son to hold these ﬁrms is to realize capital gains. We assume that creating
bubbly ﬁrms is simply a matter of luck and entails negligible costs. Natu-
rally, all young try to create them and those that are successful obtain a rent
by selling their bubbly ﬁrm during old age.16 Let Ni,t be the rent that indi-
vidual i receives. We generalize equation (1) as follows:
(10) EtCi,t 1  
 






     EtT i,t 1   EtNi,t 1
if i is an entrepreneur,





Nt 1      EtT i,t 1   EtNi,t 1
if i is a shareholder,
where Nt   Σi∈I∪I∗ Ni,t is the total value of the bubbly ﬁrms that appear at
date t. Note that the expected (gross) return on holding a bubbly ﬁrm is
equal to the (gross) growth rate of its price. This growth rate is equal to the
expected value of tomorrow’s bubbly ﬁrms at date t   1,  t 1   Et(Bt 1 –
Nt 1); divided by their value at date i, that is,  t Bt.17Equation (10) exhibits
two diﬀerences with respect to equation (1). Bubbly ﬁrms are now included
in the menu of assets, and this aﬀects the expected return on the savings of
the young. In addition, the creation of new bubbly ﬁrms generates rents for
the old, and this constitutes an additional source of income.
Equations (2) and (3) describing debt dynamics still apply, but we must
modify equation (4) describing the interest rate as follows:18
(11) r t 1   
    if Dt   1   ε   Bt,
[    ,  ] if Dt   1   ε   Bt,
  if Dt   1   ε   Bt.
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16. Success is nothing but a positive realization of an individual-speciﬁc sunspot.
17. Equation (6) implicitly assumed a ﬁxed number of bubbly ﬁrms. In this case, the ex-
pected growth rate of the bubble equals the expected price appreciation of existing bubbly
ﬁrms.
18. We assume again that governments never default on their debts. As shown before, it is
straightforward to generalize the analysis to the case in which there is an exogenous proba-
bility that governments default on their debts.Equation (11) recognizes that debt and the bubble both compete with cap-
ital for the savings of the young. In order to create its own demand, the
bubble must grow suﬃciently fast:
(12)   if Bt   0
Equation (12) ensures that the young are willing to buy bubbly ﬁrms. It
applies whenever bubbly ﬁrms have a positive value in equilibrium. We
shall construct later equilibria in which bubbly ﬁrms not only survive in
the stock market, but also drive all productive ﬁrms out of it. Finally, let
 t be the share of all bubbly ﬁrms created by U.S. residents. It then fol-
lows that
(13)  t 1   Bt 1    t   (Bt 1  ∑
i∈I∪I∗
Ni,t 1)  ∑
i∈I
Ni,t 1.
The presence of a bubble naturally aﬀects asset trade. The world capital
stock is now given by
(14) Kt   1   Dt   Bt,
and the capital stock of the United States is then  t   (1 – Dt – Bt). The U.S.
net foreign asset position is now given as follows:
(15) NFAt   (0.5    t)   Dt   (0.5    t)   Bt   (0.5    t)   (1   Dt   Bt)
Equation (15) is a natural generalization of equation (6) and includes an
additional piece of the net foreign asset position of the United States. This
piece is the second term and consists of the diﬀerence between the share of
the bubble held by U.S. residents and the share of the bubble created by
them. Now the U.S. net holdings of equity are given by the sum of the sec-
ond and third terms of equation (6).
The mechanics of this model are very close to those of the model in sec-
tion 11.2. Equations (2), (11), (12), and (13) describe the dynamics of debt
and the interest rate for a given sequence of bubbles and deﬁcits. With these
dynamics at hand, equations (14) and (15) determine the world capital
stock and the pattern of trade. With the help of additional assumptions
about the creation of new bubbly ﬁrms and the distribution of deﬁcits
among individuals, equation (10) describes the welfare of each individual.
This world economy has many equilibria now, each of them corresponding
to a diﬀerent set of (consistent) assumptions about the behavior of bubbles
and deﬁcits. We shall later construct some of these equilibria and examine
their implications.
This model allows us to study the large and persistent deterioration of
the U.S. net foreign asset position under the more realistic assumption that
the interest rate falls short of the growth rate. As is well known, this condi-
tion implies that the world economy contains pockets of dynamically in-
r t 1  
 
Et(Bt 1   Nt 1)
  
Bt
The Dot-Com Bubble, the Bush Defects, and the U.S. Current Account 477eﬃcient investments.19 The logic behind this ineﬃciency is disarmingly
simple and well understood: every period young shareholders invest  t   (1
– ε) units of the single good, while old shareholders receive a return to their
savings that on average equals r t    t–1   (1 – ε). If r t    , it is welfare-
improving to implement a social contract whereby all young shareholders
are forced to stop investing and instead give all of their income to the old
shareholders. This social contract would liberate an amount of resources
equal to (  – r t)    t–1   (1 – ε) per period, and these resources would go di-
rectly to the pockets of the future shareholders. Moreover, the generation
that starts the social contract would get an upfront fee (for its service to so-
ciety) that equals the endowment of the ﬁrst generation of young that par-
ticipate in the social contract, that is,  t   (1 – ε). This social contract there-
fore improves on the market and raises the consumption and welfare of all
generations.20
At ﬁrst sight, the practical diﬃculties in implementing this social con-
tract appear overwhelming. But this is only a false appearance. It has been
known for a long time that government debt and stock market bubbles can
both crowd out ineﬃcient investments and improve welfare. Complying
with the social contract during youth and giving the endowment to the old
can be seen as equivalent to purchasing the right to receive the endowment
of the young during old age. But this is exactly what government debt or
stock market bubbles are. When the young buy any of these assets from the
old (and thus give the old their endowment), they are doing so in the expec-
tation of reselling them to the young later during their old age (and there-
fore receiving the endowment of the young). In this way, government debt
and stock market bubbles eliminate ineﬃcient investments and liberate re-
sources that increase the consumption of all future generations. Because is-
suing debt or creating bubbly ﬁrms has negligible costs, those that create
them receive in addition an upfront fee or rent that equals the full value of
the asset created. This upfront fee or pure rent is exactly what T i,tand Ni,tare.
As the previous discussion hints, the presence of pockets of dynamically
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19. In an inﬂuential paper, Abel et al. (1989) noticed that capital income exceeds investment
in industrial countries and then argued that this observation is incompatible with the view
that these countries contain dynamically ineﬃcient investments. Their argument is mislead-
ing, however. To see this, note that in our world economy capital income is [  –   (1 – ε)]  
 t–1, while investment is  t. The observation that capital income exceeds investment, that is,  
–   (1 – ε)    , does not rule out the possibility that there exist pockets of dynamic ineﬃ-
ciency, that is,    –  . The observation that capital income exceeds investment only implies
that the average investment is dynamically eﬃcient. But this is not incompatible with the
statement that the marginal investment be dynamically ineﬃcient. Abel et al. (1989) did not
notice this because they assumed throughout that ﬁnancial markets are frictionless and, as a
result, all investments exhibit the same return. This corresponds to the special case of our
model in which   0. This is a crucial and yet unrealistic assumption. Once we remove it, the
argument of Abel et al. does not go through.
20. Because entrepreneurs receive an expected gross return to their savings that exceeds the
growth rate, their investments are dynamically eﬃcient and the government should not try to
eliminate them.ineﬃcient investments might lead to a substantial rethinking of the role of
ﬁscal policy. Naturally, ﬁscal policy still redistributes consumption across
generations. But now it also eliminates ineﬃcient investments. Because
bubbles are an alternative and market-generated solution to the same prob-
lem, this observation raises some interesting and still unanswered ques-
tions: under what conditions does ﬁscal policy complement stock market
bubbles as a mechanism to eliminate ineﬃcient investments? Under what
conditions does ﬁscal policy compete with stock market bubbles for this
role? What are the welfare implications of these interactions between bub-
bles and deﬁcits? We next show that the answers to these questions lead to
new and somewhat surprising views on U.S. economic policy.
11.5 A “Benevolent” View of U.S. Economic Policy
We next construct an equilibrium in which the stock market initially cre-
ates a bubble that is large enough to crowd out all ineﬃcient investments.
The world economy operates eﬃciently, and welfare is high. But there is a
change in investor sentiment that triggers the collapse of the bubble. The
result is that ineﬃcient investments reappear. The U.S. government reacts
to this by running large deﬁcits that crowd out some of these investments
and improve the functioning of the world economy. In this equilibrium, the
U.S. ﬁscal expansion constitutes a welfare-improving policy response to
the bubble collapse.
Consider the case of a world economy in which investor sentiment ﬂuc-
tuates between two states: St ∈ {L, H}. In the L (or low) state, investors are
pessimistic, bubbly ﬁrms are not valued, and the stock market contains
only productive ﬁrms. In the H (or high) state, investors are optimistic,
bubbly ﬁrms are valued, and they completely crowd productive ﬁrms out
of the stock market. That is, we assume that the bubble evolves as follows:
(16) Bt   
We shall assume also that Nt   0 for all t, except for those dates in which
the world economy transitions from L to H and Nt   Bt. That is, all bubbly
ﬁrms appear at the onset of the bubble. After this, no more bubbly ﬁrms are
created, and the stock market bubble contains only a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms
whose value ﬂuctuates over time until the bubble bursts. After a period
without bubble, the cycle starts again.
How do these changes in investor sentiment happen? We assume that in-
dividuals coordinate to an equilibrium using a sunspot variable that moves
between the high and low states. We refer to this variable as “investor sen-
timent.” Assume the transition probability or probability that there is a
change in investor sentiment is  . When a generation is optimistic, it be-
0 if St   L,
1   ε   Dt if St   Ht.
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When a generation is pessimistic, it believes that the probability the next
generation will buy the bubble is  . If  is suﬃciently small, optimistic gen-
erations buy the bubble, pessimistic generations do not, and the probabili-
ties assigned by both types of generations are exactly the equilibrium ones.
We assume from now on that   (1 –  )   –       . This ensures that
these changes in investor sentiment are an equilibrium. We shall see that a
change in investor sentiment that moves the world economy from the high
to the low state is nothing but a coordination failure as the low state pro-
vides less welfare than the high state.
The U.S. government recognizes the beneﬁcial role that bubbly ﬁrms
play in the world economy and avoids competing with them. When in-
vestor sentiment is high, the government refrains from running budget
deﬁcits and lets the (stock) market eliminate the ineﬃcient investments on
its own. When investor sentiment is low, the market cannot do this, and the
government runs budget deﬁcits in order to help. These deﬁcits raise gov-
ernment debt and crowd out the ineﬃcient investments that the market is
unable to eliminate by itself. In particular, we assume the United States fol-
lows this ﬁscal policy:
(17) ∑
i∈I
T i,t   
This ﬁscal policy ensures that government debt eventually absorbs all in-
eﬃcient investments if investor sentiment remains low indeﬁnitely. How-
ever, consistent with the view that the government is trying to remedy mar-
ket failures, debt will never crowd out the investments of entrepreneurs.
Throughout, and only for simplicity, we assume that ROW has no debt and
follows a balanced-budget policy, that is,  t   1 and Σi∈I∗ T i,t   0.
The assumptions made allow us to determine the equilibrium interest
rate as follows:21
(18) r t 1   
Equation (18) shows that the implications of increased government debt on
the interest rate depend crucially on investor sentiment. Note that the as-
sumptions made ensure that the interest rate is always higher when investor
    if St   L,






















r t     (1   ε) if St   L,
0 if St   H.
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21. To derive the interest rate when St   H, substitute equations (2), (16), and (17) into
equation (12) and then solve for the interest rate. Note that when St   L and Dt   1 – ε, any r t
∈ [  –  ,  ] is also an equilibrium.sentiment is high. When investor sentiment is low, the interest rate is low
because debt competes with capital, and the latter oﬀers a low expected re-
turn to shareholders. When investor sentiment is high, the interest rate is
high because debt competes with the bubble, which is a better asset than
capital. It follows from equation (15) and the assumption that Nt   0 that
the interest rate is nothing but the expected (gross) growth rate of the
bubble.
To understand what is behind equation (18), assume ﬁrst that there is no
government debt. Then, the expected growth rate of the bubble is   if there
is no change in investor sentiment, but zero if there is a change in investor
sentiment. Because the latter happens with probability  , the expected
growth rate of the bubble is   (1 –  ), and this is what the interest rate must
be when Dt   0. Assume instead that there is some debt in the world econ-
omy. Because debt dynamics are favorable, and both governments follow a
policy of balanced budgets, we have that the debt is falling, and the bubble
is replacing it. Therefore, the bubble grows faster than the world economy
as it absorbs an increasing fraction of the shareholders’ savings. The larger
is the debt, the faster it falls and the faster is the growth of the bubble and
the interest rate.
Under the assumptions made about bubbles and deﬁcits, the dynamics
of debt are given by equations (2) and (17) to (18). Substituting these dy-
namics into equation (16), we also obtain the dynamics of the bubble. It is
straightforward to check that, under our parameter restrictions, the se-
quences of bubbles and debt generated by these equations constitute an
equilibrium of the world economy. We use next this equilibrium to reinter-
pret the main macroeconomic developments of the last decade.
This equilibrium portrays an alternative and benevolent view of current
U.S. economic policy. The story goes as follows. Initially, the world starts
in the pessimistic state, with the United States having some intermediate
level of debt and a low interest rate, that is, 0   Dt   1 – ε and r t   –  . At
some date, there is a change in investor sentiment, and a stock market
bubble appears. The bulk of this bubble consists of U.S. bubbly ﬁrms, that
is, Σi∈I Ni,t   0.5. After a few periods, there is a new change in investor sen-
timent that moves the world economy back into the pessimistic state. This
brings about a collapse in the bubble that forces savers to seek alternative
assets. The questions we address next are what are the macroeconomic
eﬀects of the appearance and bursting of the bubble? What are the eﬀects
of U.S. ﬁscal policy?
Figure 11.6illustrates the dynamics of debt by plotting Dt 1as a function
of Dt. The convex upward-sloping line captures the dynamics of debt when
investor sentiment is high, while the straight upward-sloping line shows the
same when investor sentiment is low. The economy starts out with low in-
vestor sentiment and an initial level of debt D∗. Debt dynamics are favor-
able, and debt increases at a decreasing rate. Absent any further shocks, it
The Dot-Com Bubble, the Bush Defects, and the U.S. Current Account 481would asymptotically reach an upper bound of 1 – ε where it would fully
crowd out all the ineﬃcient investments of the shareholders. However, be-
fore this (when debt is equal to D0), investor sentiment changes, and a
bubble appears in the stock market. The government reacts to this by elim-
inating the budget deﬁcit, and debt begins to fall. Absent any further
shocks debt would asymptotically reach zero as it is no longer needed to
crowd out ineﬃcient investments. Before this happens, there is again a
change in investor sentiment (when debt is equal to D1), and the bubble col-
lapses. The government responds with ﬁscal deﬁcits that set debt on an up-
ward trajectory again.
During the period before the bubble appears, U.S. debt accumulates
gradually, and the net foreign asset position becomes more negative as
some of this debt is held by foreigners. The government responds to the ap-
pearance of the bubble by eliminating the budget deﬁcit, and debt accord-
ingly begins to decline. The bubble provides shareholders with a more at-
tractive investment option and therefore crowds out all productive ﬁrms
from the stock market. As time passes, government debt declines, and the
bubble keeps growing and absorbing an increasing fraction of the savings
of the shareholders. Despite the elimination of the budget deﬁcit, the in-
terest rate jumps up as government debt must now compete with the bubble
for the savings of shareholders. The interest rate then declines slowly as the
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Fig. 11.6 Debt dynamics in the benevolent viewgrowth rate of the bubble also declines over time. The net foreign asset po-
sition jumps down as the U.S. old sell their bubbly ﬁrms to the ROW young,
and the composition of the net foreign asset position of the United States
shifts from debt to equity.
This rosy situation changes overnight as a result of a change in investor
sentiment that brings about a collapse in the bubble. Suddenly, savers no
longer have access to this asset and must seek alternative investments. This
situation can be thought of as a glut of savings. Initially, the ineﬃcient in-
vestments of shareholders return, but the U.S. government reacts to this
situation by engineering a ﬁscal expansion that eliminates these ineﬃcient
investments over time. Unlike the analysis of section 11.3, debt dynamics
are favorable, and the debt grows at a decelerating rate, eventually stabiliz-
ing without the need for a ﬁscal adjustment. Despite the appearance of
budget deﬁcits, the interest rate jumps down and stays low as debt no
longer competes with the bubble. The collapse of the bubble erases a frac-
tion of the negative U.S. net holdings of equity and leads to a sharp increase
in net foreign assets. But this is quickly reversed as U.S. government debt
accumulates.
This story is therefore broadly consistent with the evidence presented in
the introduction. It can account for the boom in the stock market and the
sharp decline in budget deﬁcits during the second half of the 1990s as well
as the collapse of the stock market and the reemergence of ﬁscal deﬁcits
during the early 2000s. It can explain why interest rates were high during a
period of low budget deﬁcits but fell when high budget deﬁcits returned. It
can account for the decline in the net foreign asset position associated with
the appearance of the bubble. Moreover, by virtue of the assumption that
the bubble was created primarily in the United States, it can account for the
large expansion in foreign purchases of U.S. equity during the second half
of the 1990s, followed by a sharp reversal. This reversal in U.S. net holdings
of equity is oﬀset by a decline in U.S. net holdings of debt as the U.S. gov-
ernment issues debt and sells part of it to foreigners.
The welfare implications of this scenario are easy to spot. The appear-
ance of the bubble brings about an extraordinary bonanza for the current
generation of old as they cash in the rents from bubble creation and enjoy
an unexpectedly high level of consumption. This windfall is equivalent to
the upfront fee of implementing the part of the social contract that the debt
was not implementing, that is,  t   (1 – ε – Dt). This fee is unevenly dis-
tributed as we have assumed that most of the bubble was created by U.S.
residents. The following generations of U.S. and ROW shareholders are
not so well oﬀ as the previous one as there is no further creation of bubbly
ﬁrms. But they still enjoy the beneﬁt of a high interest rate, and this in-
creases the consumption and welfare of shareholders all around the world.
Through the high interest, shareholders receive all the gains from elimi-
nating their ineﬃcient investments just as in the social contract, that is (  –
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very good thing as it implements the social contract and everybody bene-
ﬁts.
The collapse of the bubble brings substantial hardship to the contempo-
rary generation of shareholders, who bought the bubble during their youth
and ﬁnd out in their old age that it is worthless. Somewhat unfairly, this
generation of shareholders pays a dear price for the fact that the next gen-
eration of the young decides to break the social contract and not buy the
bubble from them. This price can be understood as the devolution of the
upfront fee for destroying the social contract, that is,  t   (1 – ε – Dt). Sub-
sequent generations do not suﬀer as much although they still ﬁnd that in-
terest rates are low and, as a result, so are their consumption and welfare.
The gains from eliminating the ineﬃcient investments are lost. The burst-
ing of the bubble is a coordination failure and everybody loses from it.
The U.S. ﬁscal expansion oﬀsets part of this loss for U.S. residents. To
see this, note that we can use equation (2) to decompose the revenues from
the ﬁscal expansion, that is,  t Σi∈IT i,t, into two components. The ﬁrst one
consists of the gains from eliminating ineﬃcient investments, that is (  – r t)
   t–1   Dt. The second one consists of the upfront fee for creating debt, that
is,  t   (Dt 1 – Dt). That is, the U.S. government is gradually implementing
the social contract and distributing the gains to the diﬀerent U.S. genera-
tions in the form of transfers, that is, higher spending and lower taxes. The
ROW residents do not beneﬁt from this U.S. ﬁscal policy because they are
assumed not to receive transfer from the U.S. government, and the interest
rate remains low throughout.23
This analysis departs fundamentally from the conventional view in two
important respects. The ﬁrst one is that the ﬁscal expansion is now seen as
sustainable, while in section 11.3 it was deemed unsustainable. The second
diﬀerence is that the ﬁscal expansion is now seen as beneﬁting all genera-
tions, while in section 11.3 it was perceived as a means to redistribute con-
sumption from future to present generations. Both of these diﬀerences, of
course, are a direct consequence of removing the unrealistic assumption,
which underlies conventional views, that the interest rate exceeds the
growth rate.
How plausible is this benevolent view of U.S. economic policy? An im-
mediate objection to it comes from a simple numerical observation. Fa-
vorable debt dynamics mean that debt accumulation decelerates and even-
tually stabilizes. But this requires that the deﬁcits not be too large. To see
484 Aart Kraay and Jaume Ventura
22. To understand the welfare implications for the subsequent generations, simply remem-
ber that trading the bubble essentially means that each generation of shareholders receives the
endowment of the next one in exchange of its own.
23. They would beneﬁt too though, if we had postulated a concave technology rather than
a linear one as the debt would raise the interest rate. And this would be a positive spillover of
the U.S. ﬁscal expansion abroad.this, assume now that Σi∈I T i,t   – r t/  (1 – ε). In this case, government
debt starts crowding out eﬃcient investments before stabilizing and this
turns favorable debt dynamics into unfavorable ones. If the deﬁcits are too
large, the situation is unsustainable even if the world economy contains
pockets of dynamically ineﬃcient investments. This seems to be the situa-
tion nowadays. The U.S. economy is about 40 percent of the world econ-
omy. Its (net) growth rate is about 3 percent, the (net) interest rate is about
1.5 percent, and the budget deﬁcit remains at 5 percent of U.S. GNP. Un-
der these assumptions, by the time U.S. government debt stabilizes it has
already surpassed world savings by almost 40 percent! The current budget
deﬁcits are not sustainable, and this seems an unobjectionable conclusion
to us.
But this does not mean, however, that the benevolent view is incorrect.
The essence of this view is that the U.S. government is supplying an asset
(government debt) that is useful to eliminate ineﬃcient investments, and it
is receiving payments (deﬁcits) for this service. The time proﬁle of deﬁcits
reﬂects how these payments are distributed across the diﬀerent genera-
tions. We made the simple assumption in equation (16) that these beneﬁts
grew at the same rate as the world economy, that is, so that generation tob-
tained  t 1   T. But this is obviously not the option that the current U.S.
government has chosen. We get much closer to the actual behavior of the
U.S. government if we replace equation (17) by the following one:
(19) ∑
i∈I
Ti,t   
Under this new assumption on ﬁscal policy, equation (18) describing the
interest rate still applies. The dynamics of debt under this ﬁscal policy are
now however very diﬀerent. When the bubble bursts, the United States re-
sponds by engineering a very large ﬁscal expansion. In particular, it imme-
diately expands debt by exactly the amount required to absorb all of the
savings of the shareholders and then stabilizes debt at this level by running
much smaller deﬁcits. The ﬁrst generation after the bubble collapses re-
ceives the entire upfront fee. Future generations then simply receive the
gains from eliminating ineﬃcient investments. Whether this choice of dis-
tribution of gains corresponds to a preference for the current generation
or, instead, to a desire to compensate the generation that lost the bubble is
unclear. But to make the benevolent view consistent with observed policy,
one must assume that the lion’s share of the gains that accrue from supply-
ing government debt are being reaped by the current generation.




r t     (1   ε) if St   St 1   L,
1   ε    
 
r t     Dt 1 if St   L and St 1   H,
0 if St   H.
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2003, equaling a bit more than $3 trillion, represents the elimination of
the bubble. According to this benevolent view, the U.S. government should
run large ﬁscal deﬁcits to quickly expand public debt by about the same
amount. Interestingly, according to the baseline projections of the U.S.
Congressional Budget Oﬃce, public debt will expand by $2.6 trillion be-
tween 2000 and 2012 and then stabilize thanks to much smaller projected
budget deﬁcits of around 2 percent of GDP. This suggests that projected ﬁs-
cal policy over the next several years will be successful in eliminating almost
as many ineﬃcient investments as the stock market bubble did in the 1990s.
Of course, it is possible that a bubble reappears in the stock market in the
future, and this would require an adjustment in ﬁscal policy. According to
the benevolent view, the government should respond to the reappearance
of a stock market bubble by eliminating the ﬁscal deﬁcits. In the context of
our model, whether this ﬁscal adjustment will be painful depends on who
issues the bubble. If the United States is lucky and the new bubble is mostly
created by U.S. residents, then the rents from bubble creation will make for
most of the lost budget deﬁcits. And if this is the case, the U.S. net foreign
asset position will remain negative as U.S. residents on net sell their bubbly
ﬁrms to foreigners. If, instead, it is mostly ROW residents that issue the
new bubble, then the ﬁscal adjustment would be costly as U.S. residents
would not be compensated for the loss of the budget deﬁcits. In this case,
the U.S. net foreign asset position would turn positive as U.S. debt declines
and ROW residents sell bubbly ﬁrms to U.S. ones.
Central to our model is the result that providing an asset that eliminates
ineﬃcient investments yields a beneﬁt or fee to those that create it. Ac-
cording to the benevolent view, the government is altruistic: it lets the
private sector appropriate this beneﬁt (rents from bubbly creation) and
only intervenes when the market is incapable of providing itself with the
appropriate asset. When this is the case, the government also receives part
of this beneﬁt (the budget deﬁcits). But why would the government not
want to appropriate this beneﬁt even when the market works? One can also
imagine that the government could be opportunistic and try to displace an
existing bubble in order to capture all the beneﬁts from providing an asset
that eliminates ineﬃcient investments. These beneﬁts can then be redis-
tributed to its constituents. We examine next this possibility.
11.6 A “Cynical” View of U.S. Economic Policy
We consider next a situation in which there are two types of government,
altruistic and opportunistic. The altruistic government acts as in the previ-
ous section, and allows the private sector to capture the rents from bubble
creation. The opportunistic government expands public debt and crowds
out the bubble in order to capture these rents and distribute them to its
486 Aart Kraay and Jaume Venturaconstituents. We construct an equilibrium in which initially the altruistic
government is in power, and the stock market creates a bubble that is large
enough to crowd out all ineﬃcient investments. The government responds
by eliminating its budget deﬁcits and making room for the bubble to grow.
But there is a change in government, and this leads to a drastic change in
ﬁscal policy. The opportunistic government starts a ﬁscal expansion whose
objective is to crowd out the bubble and in this way appropriate its value.
In this equilibrium, the U.S. ﬁscal expansion constitutes a beggar-thy-
neighbor policy that is responsible for the collapse in the stock market.
Let Gt∈{A, O} be a state variable indicating whether the altruistic (Gt 
A) or the opportunistic (Gt   O) government is in power, and let   be the
probability the U.S. government changes type. As in the previous section,
the altruistic government uses ﬁscal policy to immediately eliminate ineﬃ-
cient investments whenever the stock market fails to do so. Therefore equa-
tion (19) still applies when Gt   A. Instead, the opportunistic government
uses ﬁscal policy to appropriate as many resources as possible and then dis-
tributes them as it sees ﬁt. As a result, when Gt   O, we must replace equa-




where   ∈ (0, 1]. Because 1 – ε – r t/  Dt–1 is the value of productive and
bubbly ﬁrms owned by shareholders, equation (20) is simply saying that the
opportunistic government runs budgets deﬁcits that crowd out a fraction  
of these ﬁrms. Note that this ﬁscal policy does not depend on investor sen-
timent. The government always expands debt when it arrives to power, re-
gardless of whether this displaces ineﬃcient investments or a stock market
bubble.
Is the bubble in equation (16) consistent with the existence of the op-
portunistic government? Assume ﬁrst that   is small so that when investor
sentiment is high the opportunistic government would displace bubble
slowly and only in part. In this case, the expected growth rate of the bubble
still exceeds the return to the ineﬃcient investments. And, as a result, the
bubble in equation (16) still constitutes an equilibrium. The interest rate
(which can be obtained by the same procedure we obtained equation [18])
depends on which government is in power. In particular, when investor sen-
timent is high, the interest rate will be lower when the opportunistic gov-
ernment is in power. This reﬂects the eﬀect of ﬁscal policy on the size of the
bubble and therefore the return it oﬀers. The opportunistic government
makes the bubble a worse asset, and debt does not need to oﬀer a high in-
terest rate to compete with it.
   1   ε    
 




r t     (1   ε) if Dt 1   1   ε,
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opportunistic government would displace the bubble rapidly and com-
pletely. Anticipating this, the demand for the bubble drops to zero, and the
bubble bursts, forcing holders of the bubble to ﬁnd alternative investments.
The arrival of an opportunistic government bursts the bubble on impact
and leads to the reemergence of ineﬃcient investments. As a result, equa-
tion (16) no longer constitutes an equilibrium and must be replaced by the
following one:24
(21) Bt   
Equation (21) recognizes that, if   is high enough, the bubble can only ex-
ist if investor sentiment is high and the government is altruistic. From now
on, we shall assume that the opportunistic government crowds out the
bubble immediately, that is,   → 1, and we consider the bubble in equation
(21). Note that in this case, there is a bubbly state where both the altruistic
government is in power and investor sentiment is high and a nonbubbly
state where either investor sentiment is low, the opportunistic government
is in power, or both.
Given our assumptions, we have now that the equilibrium interest rate is
given by25
(22) r t 1   
where   1 – (1 –  )   (1 –  ) is the probability that the economy transi-
tions from the bubbly to the nonbubbly state. Note that the expression for
the interest rate is identical to that in equation (18), with the exception that
we must replace the transition probability   with  . The intuitions are also
identical: in the absence of a bubble, the interest rate is low because debt
competes with capital, and the latter oﬀers a low expected return to share-
holders. When the bubble appears, the interest rate is high because debt
competes with the bubble, which is a better asset than capital.
Interestingly, the equilibrium of this section is observationally equiva-
lent to that of the previous section. In both equilibria, when the bubble ex-
ists, budget deﬁcits are zero, and the bubble absorbs all of the ineﬃcient in-

















  if St   H and Gt   A,
0 if St   L or Gt   O,
1   ε   Dt if St   H and Gt   A.
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24. Can the bubble exist even if there is an altruistic government in power? The answer is
positive if the transition probability   is low enough (one example was the model of the pre-
vious section that is nothing but the limiting case where   → 0). We assume this now, but we
shall come back to this important point later.
25. Once again, note that when St   L or Gt  0 and Dt   1 – ε, any r t ∈ (  –  ,  ) is also an
equilibrium.vestments of the shareholders. In both equilibria, the bursting of the
bubble is accompanied by a glut of saving followed by a large ﬁscal expan-
sion that ensures that debt now performs the same task of eliminating in-
eﬃcient investments. The welfare consequences of these two equilibria are
also the same. When the bubble collapses, both U.S. and ROW sharehold-
ers suﬀer large losses. The U.S. shareholders of the current generation are
compensated for this loss by the large ﬁscal deﬁcit that corresponds to the
up-front fee for creating debt, but ROW shareholders receive none of this.
The collapse of the bubble therefore implements a transfer from ROW to
the United States.
The key diﬀerence between the two equilibria lies in the underlying
shock that leads to the bursting of the bubble. The ﬁrst possibility corre-
sponds to the benevolent view that we have already discussed: investor sen-
timent changes exogenously, and an altruistic government responds by
running large ﬁscal deﬁcits. This policy reaction does not hurt ROW resi-
dents because the bubble bursts anyway but helps U.S. residents. The other
possibility corresponds to a more cynical view: when the opportunistic
government comes into power, it immediately crowds out the bubble in or-
der to appropriate its value. This policy reaction hurts ROW residents as
the bubble would not have burst without it. In this case, U.S. ﬁscal policy
is a beggar-thy-neighbor type of policy.
Is this cynical view a good description of macroeconomic events over the
past ten years? An immediate objection has to do with the timing of col-
lapse of the bubble and the emergence of budget deﬁcits. After all, in the
United States the Nasdaq peaked in March of 2000, and the Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) 500 peaked in September of 2000, while the new administra-
tion took oﬃce in January of 2001. But this does not mean, however, that
the cynical view is incorrect. Note that a bubble is not feasible if   1 – (1
–  )   (1 –  ) is high enough. At the cost of further notation, it is possible
to make   vary stochastically over time. In such a setup, an increase in the
probability that the opportunistic government takes over is all that is
needed to create the collapse of the bubble.
This immediately suggests a slightly modiﬁed version of the cynical view
that can account for the timing of the bubble collapse and the appearance
of the budget deﬁcits. It goes as follows: as the elections approached, in-
vestors revised upwards their expectations of the arrival of an opportunis-
tic government (Democrat or Republican, the theory has nothing to say
about this). This leads to the collapse of the bubble. When the new admin-
istration arrived, it engineered a ﬁscal expansion, and this conﬁrmed in-
vestor expectations. Or did it not? After all, a benevolent government
would also have engineered a ﬁscal expansion in this situation. Because
government intentions are not observable to us, we can only conclude that
an increased probability of the appearance of an opportunistic govern-
ment can break the bubble. Whether the subsequent government run large
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tell. But it does not really matter for the story.
11.7 Final Remarks
We have provided a joint account of some of the major U.S. macroeco-
nomic events of the past decade: large current account deﬁcits and a steady
decline in the net foreign asset position, the large boom and subsequent
crash in the stock market, and the emergence of large ﬁscal deﬁcits. Ac-
cording to the conventional view, the evolution of the stock market and ﬁs-
cal deﬁcits are more or less unrelated events, with the former driven by
sharp swings in U.S. productivity and the latter by shifting U.S. political
considerations. Both of these in turn fueled current account deﬁcits that
must eventually be reversed as the accumulation of public debt becomes ex-
cessive.
We instead propose two alternative views in which the stock market and
the ﬁscal deﬁcits are closely linked. Central to our account is the notion
that the world economy contains pockets of dynamically ineﬃcient invest-
ments. This opens the possibility for asset bubbles to exist, which in turn
provides a more plausible explanation for the large swings in equity values
over the past decade. The appearance of a bubble in the U.S. stock market
in the second half of the 1990s accounts for much of the decline in U.S. net
foreign assets during this period. At the same time, the bubble raised wel-
fare worldwide by eliminating ineﬃcient investments.
According to the benevolent view, the collapse of the stock market in
2000 was the result of a coordination failure or change in investor senti-
ment, and the rapid expansion of public debt since then served to displace
ineﬃcient investments in the same way that the bubble did. Viewed in this
light, the large budget deﬁcits of the Bush administration can be inter-
preted as a welfare-improving response to this market failure. But there is
also a more cynical interpretation that is observationally equivalent to the
benevolent view. Under this interpretation, the increased probability of a
ﬁscal expansion is what caused the collapse of the bubble. The subsequent
budget deﬁcits validated this change in expectations about government be-
havior. This view interprets the large budget deﬁcits of the Bush adminis-
tration as a successful attempt to appropriate the value of the bubble from
its U.S. and foreign owners.
To explore these ideas, we have used a minimalist model that puts a large
weight on theoretical clarity even at the cost of leaving out many important
aspects of reality. The advantage of this approach is that, by clearly expos-
ing the main mechanisms at work, it provides a simple but rigorous frame-
work to think about the interactions between stock market bubbles, bud-
get deﬁcits, and the current account. This framework has been used to
provide a qualitative account of the recent U.S. macroeconomic experi-
490 Aart Kraay and Jaume Venturaence. But this can only be seen as a ﬁrst step toward a fuller understanding
of this period of U.S. economic history. The natural next step is to use the
framework presented here to provide a quantitative account of the recent
U.S. macroeconomic experience. This will no doubt require enriching the
theory by bringing back some of those important aspects of reality that
have been left out here.
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Comment Joseph E. Gagnon
The paper by Kraay and Ventura provides an original and provocative in-
terpretation of the forces behind the U.S. current account deﬁcit. In one
sense, however, this interpretation is conventional in that it focuses on de-
velopments in the United States rather than in the rest of the world. As an
explanation of the past ten years, I ﬁnd Kraay and Ventura unconvincing. I
think that more persuasive explanations focus on developments in the rest
of the world in an otherwise more conventional setting. However, over the
past few years, the continued secular decline in private rates of return—de-
spite the recovery from recession—raises the possibility that the noncon-
ventional approach of Kraay and Ventura may have useful applications.
The critical assertion of Kraay and Ventura is that the global economy
is dynamically ineﬃcient because the marginal product of capital, net of
agency costs, is less than the growth rate of the economy. In support of this
assertion, Kraay and Ventura show that ex post real returns on one-year
U.S. Treasury bills have rarely exceeded, and have often been far lower
than, the growth rate of U.S. real GDP over the past thirty-ﬁve years.
Abel et al. (1989) argue that the riskless return on Treasury bills is not an
appropriate measure of the marginal productivity of capital because in-
vestors are willing to forego a large risk premium to hold safe government
bills. Abel et al. showed that an alternative gauge of dynamic eﬃciency on
a steady-state growth path is whether the ﬂow of income from private cap-
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eral Reserve Board.ital exceeds the resources invested in private capital. Using national ac-
counts data, they found that this condition was satisﬁed in the United
States for every year since 1929 and in six other industrial countries for
every year since 1960.
Kraay and Ventura point out that Abel et al. (1989) is based on the im-
plicit assumption that the marginal returns to capital equal the average re-
turns. In the model of Kraay and Ventura, nonentrepreneurs are the mar-
ginal investors in private capital and they must forego an agency cost that
prevents them from earning the true marginal product of capital. Entre-
preneurs, on the other hand, do reap the full returns from capital, but they
are inframarginal. Kraay and Ventura argue that the capital income of en-
trepreneurs may be large enough to raise total capital income in the econ-
omy above total capital expenditures, and yet the marginal return to capi-
tal may be lower than the growth rate.
Careful consideration of the data for the United States does not support
Kraay and Ventura’s claim. Entrepreneurs are to be found among the pro-
prietors of non-incorporated businesses, including landlords, and among
the upper management of corporations. Thus, a conservative measure of
capital returns to nonentrepreneurs would exclude proprietors’ and rental
income as well as employee salaries and beneﬁts paid by corporations.
Abel et al. (1989) anticipated these concerns, and they presented alterna-
tive calculations based on the proﬁts and net interest paid of the U.S. non-
ﬁnancial corporate sector.1 Extending their analysis to more recent years
(for the total corporate sector) does not reverse the result.2
The second approach to measuring the marginal return on private capital
is to use the yield on median-rated corporate bonds. Figure 11C.1 displays
the Baa corporate bond yield and the nominal growth rate of U.S. GDP since
1975. Except for the unanticipated inﬂation of the late 1970s and the last two
years, the corporate bond yield has comfortably exceeded the growth rate of
GDP. Subtracting 30 to 40 basis points to correct for historical default losses
on these bonds would not reverse this result.3 Given that equities are even
more risky than corporate bonds, it is plausible to suppose that much of the
excess of capital income over capital expenditure documented by Abel et al.
(1989) ﬂows to equity holders, who are also marginal investors.
It may be argued that there are speciﬁc ﬁrms within the universe of bond
and equity issuers that are bubbly, but there is no reason to believe that tra-
ditional eﬃcient ﬁrms are not also borrowing at the margin. And, given
that marginal returns on capital do exceed the growth rate, the coexistence
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1. Despite the recent controversy over expensing of employee stock options in accounting
statements, the Bureau of Economic Analysis has always subtracted the value of exercised op-
tions from corporate proﬁts in the national income accounts.
2. To be speciﬁc, in 2004 corporate proﬁts including capital consumption allowance plus
net business interest equaled about 15 percent of GDP. Private nonresidential investment
equaled less than 11 percent of GDP.
3. This is based on ten-year cumulative default and recovery rates from Hamilton, Varma,
Ou, and Cantor (2005).of eﬃcient and bubbly ﬁrms relies on an element of market irrationality
that Kraay and Ventura have sought to avoid.
Given the originality and simplicity of Kraay and Ventura’s analysis, it
would be churlish to criticize it too heavily for omitting real-world compli-
cations. Thus, I will simply point out a few issues that would beneﬁt from
further analysis in future work: (a) the model does not allow for diminish-
ing returns to capital and there is no complementarity between labor and
capital; (b) both goods and ﬁnancial markets are perfectly integrated
across countries; (c) prices are perfectly ﬂexible, and there are no cyclical
movements in output; thus there is no scope for countercyclical monetary
or ﬁscal policy, despite the fact that ﬁscal policy is central to the paper; and
(d) as already mentioned, there are no risk premiums in ﬁnancial markets.
The following is one point on the benevolent versus the cynical view of
U.S. ﬁscal policy: the benevolent view ﬁts the timing of events much better
than the cynical view. The stock market correction (at least in the tech-
heavy Nasdaq where the bubble was concentrated) began a year before the
Bush administration came to power. Kraay and Ventura argue that chang-
ing expectations about the election outcome and future ﬁscal policy could
have been suﬃcient to prick the equity bubble far in advance of any legis-
lated policy change. However, they present no evidence that the timing of
the stock market correction had anything to do with expectations of future
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Fig. 11C.1 U.S. corporate bond yield and GDP growth (nominal, percent)ﬁscal policy. Indeed, most analysts continued to predict future ﬁscal sur-
pluses for months afterthe Bush administration took oﬃce.4The fall in eq-
uity prices and the subsequent recession clearly have led to a larger and
more persistent ﬁscal deﬁcit than would have been likely had there been no
crash and no recession.5
I think a more plausible story is that the equity boom and bust reﬂect the
diﬃculty of evaluating the proﬁt implications of the technology surge.6
When dot-com ﬁrms proved less proﬁtable than hoped, the market tanked.7
The subsequent ﬁscal expansion may have had an exogenous political com-
ponent, but it clearly was well timed as countercyclical policy. Together,
these two factors supported the current account deﬁcit. But other impor-
tant factors were at work. The secular economic slowdowns in Europe and
Japan led to an outﬂow of saving. The emerging market ﬁnancial crises of
the 1990s led to disillusionment about the ability of fast-growing develop-
ing countries to absorb more capital productively. The result has been a
ﬂood of capital into the United States and low worldwide interest rates.
The glut of foreign saving relative to foreign investment is likely respon-
sible for the decline in corporate bond yields recently. The central assump-
tion of Kraay and Ventura—that the world is dynamically ineﬃcient be-
cause the return to capital is less than the economic growth rate—may hold
true in the future even if it was not true in the 1990s. Thus, there may yet be
a payoﬀ to the nonconventional analysis of Kraay and Ventura.
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7. Kraay and Ventura view deviations in the market value of equity from the underlying re-
placement cost of capital as evidence of bubblelike behavior. Hall (2001) interprets these de-
viations as reﬂecting the value of intangible capital such as patents, brands, and business pro-
cesses. Kraay and Ventura ask why this value declined sharply after 2000. In fact, as shown in
Kraay and Ventura’s ﬁgure 11.3, most of the run-up in share prices in the 1990s had not dis-
appeared as of 2004. The stock market bubble is more appropriately described as a moderate
and short-lived hump on the back of an enormous fundamental surge in valuations.